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INTRODUCTION
ROBERT H. MUNDHEIM*-
The last few years have seen an enormous increase in the amount
of raw material which the practicing securities lawyer must digest to
keep current. The information explosion in the securities field is
reflected in the launching of a weekly service analyzing and selectively
reprinting legislation, proposed legislation, rules, proposed rules, cases,
briefs, speeches, studies and conferences,' a bi-monthly service printing
short articles and case analyses,2 and the publication of a book, with
periodic supplements, devoted entirely to rule lOb-5.3 In this hectic
environment the practicing securities lawyer will welcome a volume
of articles which thoughtfully analyzes a number of the most important
developments of the recent period. The articles in this Symposium
present the opportunity for reflection which the rush of current mate-
rial normally stifles.
This Symposium is the second in a series of special editions pub-
lished by the St. John's Law Review. The first special edition looked
at conglomerate mergers and acquisitions.4 In the introduction to that
issue the editors stated that:
The project is grounded upon a firm belief that the problems
posed by conglomerate growth transcend traditional academic
boundaries and can be analyzed satisfactorily only within an inter-
disciplinary context. We have thus sought to overcome the patent
inadequacy of previous publications, which have invariably been
limited to a single perspective- be it law or economics, taxation
or finance, management or accounting.5
The editors of this Symposium did not attempt the same inter-
* Fred Carr Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Director,
University of Pennsylvania Law School Center for Study of Financial Institutions.
1 SEc. tEG. & L. REP.
2 REv. OF SEc. REG.
3 A. BROtiBER, SEcurrms LAW: FRAuD- EC RuI.E lOb-5 (1969).
4 CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND AcQuissiONS: OPINION & ANALYSIS, 44 ST. JoHN's L. Rv.
(Special Ed. 1970).
S Id. at xiii.
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disciplinary approach, opting instead to fulfill the securities practi-
tioner's demand for a more traditional analysis.
However, I suspect that the editors of the St. John's Law Review
will be encouraged by their success with this volume to supplement it
with a volume which pursues, in the securities regulation area, the
interdisciplinary path cited as necessary for a full understanding of
the conglomerate phenomenon.
The importance of applying the interdisciplinary approach to the
securities field is suggested in some of these articles and underscored
by a significant regulatory event which occurred after this Symposium
was planned. This event was the publication in March 1971 of the
Institutional Investor Study and the crystallization of initial SEC rec-
ommendations based on its findings. Dr. Donald Farrar, an economist
and presently Senior Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania Law
School Center for Study of Financial Institutions, directed the Study.
The Associate Directors of the Study, Dr. Seymour Smidt and Dr.
Lawrence Jone§, are also economists.
Although the Study has not yet had great public impact, it moved
the SEC to recommend that economic studies "should be a major part
of the Commission's regular and continuous activities," and to stress
the need for developing a substantially larger internal economic re-
search capability. An expanded economic research capability takes on
added significance in the context of Professor Ratner's observations
that the new generation of problems facing the SEC "intermix securi-
ties market questions with questions of capital allocation, anti-trust
policy, tax policy and regulation of banks, insurance companies and
other types of financial institutions."6
The economist-dominated Institutional Investor Study focused
attention on at least two areas of major regulatory concern. First, the
Study examined the impact on the growth of multi-purpose financial
service organizations of regulatory provisions which limit price com-
petition and encourage service competition. For example, the mini-
mum commission rate structure of the exchange markets encourages
member firms to offer services, such as investment advice, as a method
of competing for customers for the firm's brokerage facilities. SEC
action forcing the exchanges to permit negotiation of commissions on
those portions of orders in excess of $500,000 seems to mark a first
step in the process of requiring unbundling of service packages. It is
likely that future regulatory effort will be directed toward requiring
6 Ratner, The SEG: Portrait of the Agency as a Thirty-Seven Year Old, 45 ST. JoN's
L. Rgv. 583 (1971).
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identification of specific services and their costs so that customers can
buy only those services they wish. In the brokerage area, negotiated
rates already are forcing the development of execution only rates -
rates which will not underwrite provision of additional services such
as research. In the mutual fund area, such regulatory effort provides
impetus for analyzing out the cost of investment advice from the cost
of providing other services under the investment advisory contract. By
turning attention to price competition, the SEC is giving more weight
than it previously has to promoting efficiency in the creation and
marketing of financial services.
A second area on which the Institutional Investor Study focused
attention is the need to develop a strong central market place for the
trading of securities. Under the prodding of the Study the SEC an-
nounced that:
A major goal and ideal of the securities market and the securi-
ties industry has been the creation of a strong central market
system for securities of national importance, in which all buying
and selling interest in these securities could participate and be
represented under a competitive regime. This goal has not yet
been attained.7
The articulation of this goal gives needed direction to the SEC's at-
tempts to discharge its regulatory responsibilities under the Securities
Exchange Act.
The Institutional Investor Study makes an important contribu-
tion to the regulatory process by forcing the SEC to take account of
economic techniques and insights in making regulatory decisions. I
find that a welcome advance from remarks made over a year ago by
the Solicitor of the SEC in a debate on the propriety of governmental
regulation of insider trading. The Solicitor said:
Since I believe Congress was attempting to improve the moral-
ity of the market place, I think that the economic effort is largely
irrelevant - at least in the absence of indications showing dire
happenings to public investors or the market generally.8
The process of having economists work with lawyers in shaping
the regulatory environment is not easy. There are differences of
vocabulary: most lawyers do not speak math. And there are differences
in approach. Economists tend to limit themselves to exploring those
7 SEC Letter of Transmittal of the Institutional Investor Study Report, H.R. Doc.
No. 64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at xxiv (1971).
8Ferber, The Case Against Insider Trading: A Response to Professor Manne, 23
VAND. L. REv. 621, 622 (1970).
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arrangements which, under a given set of circumstances, produce the
greatest efficiency. Lawyers, on the other hand, search for institutional
arrangements which best accommodate a wide variety of interests.
For example, an economist might see a central market place with a
number of large firms accounting for almost all the securities business
as providing the economically most efficient arrangement. The lawyer-
dominated regulatory agency has traditionally sought to balance
against such an arrangement desires such as preservation of small
broker-dealers and regionally oriented firms which may be based on
political or social considerations. When the lawyer in the regulatory
agency works on the problem of market structure with an economist,
he is forced specifically to identify the various interests other than effi-
ciency which he seeks to serve. The identification process leads the
lawyer to assess the cost of departing from the economically most
efficient solution and may show him that it is too expensive to accom-
modate certain interests or that the various interests he seeks to protect
can most efficiently be served through a new set of arrangements. Thus,
the decision making process can be enhanced by forcing lawyers to
subject their analyses to the discipline imposed by the economist's
questions.
The very useful function served by this Symposium's collection of
lawyer-written articles argues for supplementation by another volume
which applies to the securities field the interdisciplinary philosophy of
the earlier Symposium on conglomerate mergers and acquisitions. I
hope that the editors of this future volume will not only invite econo-
mists to contribute articles but also require at least some of the articles
to be co-authored by an economist and a lawyer. Co-authorship forces
the lawyer and the economist to participate together in the entire
process of analyzing a problem. The discipline of such co-authorship
should make an important contribution to shaping a better regulatory
environment for the securities business.
